Mark A. Drumbl This Article explores the role of rule of law in redressing crimes and human rights abuses committed against the women of Afghanistan. Mainstream discourse approaches the situation binarily, obliging women to choose between international and often distant human rights, on the one hand, or proximate cultural/religious norms, on the other, in order to adjudicate gender crimes. This can lead either to externalized justice or, in the case of the implementation of Afghan local law, to renewed victimization of women in the name of redressing abuses suffered by other women. Local law in Afghanistan is reflected in codes such as the Pashtunwali. The Pashtunwali consists of a blend of custom and practice that emerges from a context of embedded conflict and is filtered through an Islamist lens. The Pashtunwali propounds a restorative approach to human rights abuse in which the abuse is rectified when the family of the abuser transfers money, goods, animals or, preferentially, young girls *350 or women to the family of the abused. Drawing from recent literature on law and culture, this Article posits that custom and culture in Afghanistan as operationalized through the Pashtunwali are politically contingent (and at the moment defined by patriarchal elites) instead of statically or immutably oppressive to women. If thoughtfully constructed, transitional justice institutions can play an important collective role that transcends the adjudication of individual guilt or innocence. They can pluralize the number of domestic actors that contribute to the definition of customary and cultural norms. This implies that transitional criminal interventions could play a democratizing role insofar as they could advance claims by all members of local communities to a right to involve themselves in the formulation of customary law. In the end, this Article links transitional criminal justice to the innovative conception of freedom within culture, instead of freedom from culture.
I. Introduction
The Taliban governed Afghanistan from 1996 until its ouster by international armed intervention in November 2001.
[FN1] The Taliban was infamous for its brutality, extremism, and misogyny. Although many Afghan governments have instilled fear among the Afghan *351 population, the Taliban did so in a particularly poignant fashion.
The optimism that immediately followed the demise of the Taliban has dissipated over time. Afghanistan remains an extremely violent and dangerous place.
[FN2] The fact that a climate of impunity reigns throughout Afghanistan regarding the violence of the past encourages violence in the present. In this vein, scant progress has been made in holding individual perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including gender crimes, accountable for their actions.
[FN3] Nor have there been effective challenges to many of the structural and systemic factors that conspired to create a framework of collective gender apartheid. The reality of life for Afghan women remains one of segregation and struggle within a climate of fear.
[FN4]
*352 This Article challenges this stasis and its resultant impunity. There is, after all, a role for rule of law in redressing the longstanding abuses suffered by the women of Afghanistan. However, as I have argued elsewhere, the justice emanating from foreign or international legal interventions often becomes externalized from the societies that this justice is intended to assist.
[FN5] One way to mitigate this externalization is to embed international norms within local contexts, perhaps through the use of ordinary local justice mechanisms. In the case of Afghanistan, however, the invocation of ordinary local law--whether substantive or procedural--to punish perpetrators of gender crimes may prompt troubling outcomes. In Afghanistan, local justice involves a fusion of Islamic and customary law that responds to and reflects endemic cultures of war. In the majority Pashtun community of Afghanistan, this customary law is called the Pashtunwali. The Pashtunwali resonates among certain local constituencies as legitimate local law. However, the punishments and reparations it imposes on systematic human rights abusers themselves amount to human rights abuses, particularly against women. For example, conveying women as chattel among clans constitutes a preferred form of reparation under the Pashtunwali for a broad array of human rights violations. For those women who are so conveyed, the Pashtunwali creates a situation of sexual terror in the name of pursuing accountability for prior wrongs.
Part II of this Article discusses gender crimes in Afghanistan and the steps that have been taken under the new regime led by President Hamid Karzai to provide a legal framework to redress these crimes and prospectively empower Afghanistan's women. For the most part, these steps have been timid. Moreover, the weak authority of the Karzai regime over most of Afghanistan undermines those steps that actually have been taken.
II. Violence Against Afghan Women
Under the Taliban's regime of sexual apartheid, women were subject to gender crimes and sexual violence. [FN8] Examples include: abduction and sexual enslavement, [FN9] forced marriage to Taliban soldiers and foreign fighters, [FN10] selling and trafficking of girls and young women, [FN11] rape and murder during internal armed conflict, [FN12] *355 death by stoning for women convicted of adultery, [FN13] hanging of convicted female prostitutes, [FN14] and public lashing of unwed couples convicted of having sexual relations. [FN15] Women were obliged to travel with a male relative and to wear the burqa (chadari). [FN16] Violations of these obligations resulted in public beatings by militiamen.
[FN17] Women were not allowed to work outside the home, except in strictly limited circumstances in the health care field and on humanitarian projects. Schools for girls older than eight years of age were closed. [FN18] Access to the dilapidated Afghan health care system was limited for women, resulting in an average life expectancy of forty-five years and extremely high rates of maternal mortality.
[FN19] These examples are not discrete; in fact, they weave together cumulatively to define the lives of women in Afghanistan and to create an all-encompassing insecurity and fear of participating in public life.
To be sure, the Taliban institutionalized gender apartheid. That said, pervasive gender violence (and systemic gender discrimination) existed prior to the rise of the Taliban. Moreover, rape, forcible deportation, and abduction of women have been used as weapons of war by all parties to Afghanistan's internecine conflicts and as methods to persecute various minority ethnic or religious groups. [FN20] The international community chose not to intercede in Afghanistan while many of these tragic events, including the most extreme practices of sexual apartheid, took place under the Taliban, [FN21] although it did intervene after Western interests were threatened by the Taliban's support of al-Qaeda. This leads Ratna Kapur to view as ironic the political use for Western audiences of the putative liberation of the Afghan woman as a justification for the armed intervention in Afghanistan. [FN22] In fact, some progressive women's groups in Afghanistan opposed the use of force on the grounds that attacking Afghanistan would jeopardize the well-being of Afghan women. [FN23] These groups continue to point out that U.S. failure meaningfully to support pluralistic political transition in Afghanistan has blighted opportunities for women's human rights and has in fact reinstated patriarchy. [FN24] Moreover, the plight of Afghan women is indissoluble from the general plight of the Afghan population and the pervasiveness of human rights abuses throughout Afghanistan. To varying extents, almost every political, ethnic, or religious group in Afghanistan has been implicated in violence, both as victim and perpetrator. As such, women were and remain subject to abuse not only because of gender but also because of ethnicity, politics, social class, and religion. Justice for the women of Afghanistan involves redressing the criminality to which they were subject as women as well as the criminality to which they were subject owing to other manifestations of their identity. To this end, accountability for gender crimes is a crucial component of the process of overall accountability for human rights abuses in Afghanistan.
General abuses attributed to the Taliban include: [FN25] forced deportation; massacres; torture; extrajudicial executions; support of international terrorism; disappearances of prisoners; religious and ethnic persecution of the Hazara group (who are Shiite Muslims as *357 opposed to the majority Sunni Muslims); [FN26] politicide; and destruction of cultural property.
[FN27] Many of these actions constitute gross human rights offenses, namely serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law that, in turn, may qualify as crimes under international law and for which there may be a duty to investigate, prosecute, and punish.
Although the Taliban was particularly zealous in its abusiveness, it certainly was not unique. Rights abuses have occurred throughout years of internecine conflict in Afghanistan. For example, "[t]he first communist regime of 1977-1979, the Khalqs led by Taraki and then Amin, killed 50,000 to 100,000 in purges of potential opponents." [FN28] Additionally, many Taliban became victims of human rights abuses and war crimes, in particular during the Taliban's ouster from power in the fall of 2001. [FN29] Moreover, the criminalization of breaches of sharply circumscribed gender roles and widespread physical attacks on those who breach these roles persists in post-Taliban Afghanistan. So, too, do systematic crimes against women, such as sexual assault and rape, which were used as methods to exact reprisals against the Taliban and the majority Pashtun ethnic group during the 2001 armed conflict. [FN30] Human Rights Watch reported that Northern Alliance forces sexually assaulted, abducted, and forcibly married many women. [FN31] Many Northern Alliance leaders currently ensconced in political office and *358 directly supported by U.S. forces in the interests of U.S. national security, such as Abdul Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan, have orchestrated systematic rape and war crimes. [FN32] Reports of torture, arbitrary justice, persecuted minorities, and internal feuds abound. [FN33] When "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack," [FN34] sexual violence could amount to crimes against humanity. To be sure, sexual violence is not exclusively directed against women. Men and boys can also be victims of sexual violence and sexual torture, as is the case in Afghanistan. [FN35] However, women are the primary victims of sexual violence. In Afghanistan, this violence enables misogyny to persist as official state policy. Ismail Khan, the Governor of Herat, has forced women to undergo "chastity checks" [FN36] and has forbidden them to shake the hands of foreign men. [FN37] The general lawlessness and insecurity that today characterize life in Afghanistan make women all the more vulnerable to sexual violence. Schools that were reopened for girls following the ouster of the Taliban have been bombed, students threatened, and teachers attacked. [FN38] Afghanistan's widespread poverty has increased the practice of the sale by parents of their young daughters, putatively as *359 brides but in practice as prostitutes, thereby contributing to global patterns of sex trafficking. [FN39] Although selling girls is prohibited by Islamic law, local custom is more ambiguous, so much so that one Afghan jurist opines that "nobody would ever be charged for selling a daughter." [FN40] Many Afghans support bringing Taliban officials in particular, and human rights abusers in general, to justice for at least some of these atrocities. In fact, general discussion of retrospective trials formed part of the reconstruction compromise agreed to by all of Afghanistan's ethnic groups in negotiations held in Bonn, Germany that led to the transitional Bonn Agreement of December 5, 2001. This was followed by the formation of the Afghan Interim Administration, chaired by Hamid Karzai, who was subsequently elected President of Afghanistan by a tribal council (loya jirga) in June 2002. Free and fair elections are to be held no later than two years from the convening of this loya jirga. The Bonn Agreement also established an Afghan Human Rights Commission. However, this entity has received insufficient support and its staff is regularly threatened with violence which, in turn, inhibits its purely investigative and declaratory functions. [FN41] In the case of gender crimes, the new Karzai government has provided a formal legal framework to protect victims and prospectively empower Afghanistan's women. The Bonn Agreement stated that parts of the 1964 Constitution of Afghanistan would apply on an interim basis until the adoption of a new constitution, including those parts prohibiting discrimination based on gender. [FN42] Pursuant to the Bonn Agreement, existing laws and regulations of Afghanistan remain in effect to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the 1964 Afghan Constitution--subject to some limitations--and the international legal obligations, or treaties, to *360 which Afghanistan is a party. [FN43] The transition process authorized by the Bonn Agreement, including the rebuilding of the legal system, is to be "gender-sensitive." [FN44] In fact, the U.N. has called for full participation of women in political decision-making. [FN45] On the ground, however, the reality is quite different. The formal legal system established under the provisions of the 1964 Constitution has never been the norm governing the lives of the majority of the population. Instead, the informal legal system, composed of an amalgam of Islamic law and customary law, provides order and administers punishment. In fact, "past experience would suggest that any attempt to implement and enforce secular statutory laws which depart from customary and/or particular interpretations of Islamic law is liable to be met with protests and perhaps even civil unrest." [FN46] Tangible steps to address gender crimes and institutionalized gender discrimination have been timid overall. The Karzai regime has little authority over most of Afghanistan. Those who exercise authority, such as local warlords, tend to be ultra-conservative. Religious fundamentalism is on the rise. Many official gender restrictions have returned since the Bonn Agreement. Certain warlords who were (and remain) "allies of the U.S.-led coalition in the war against the Taliban . . . used their connections to the United States to seize power but then embraced some of the Taliban's most odious restrictions," including curtailing educational opportunities for women, forcing chastity examinations, imprisoning women for refusing to marry or for leaving a marriage, requiring women to wear the burqa, and blocking redress in cases of state-orchestrated sexual assault. [FN47] Lack of education and unavailability of employment remain *361 significant impediments for the reintegration of women into public life. III. Law, Values, and Transition Prosecuting and punishing human rights abusers can promote retributive (deontological), deterrent (consequentialist), reconstructive, and expressive goals. According to the retributivist, certain systematic human rights abuses--including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes--constitute radical evil. Perpetrators of radical evil will receive their just deserts when their wrongdoings are prosecuted as extraordinary crimes as opposed to ordinary crimes under ordinary municipal criminal statutes. Punishment is to be visited upon offenders regardless of the effects of that punishment. There also is an important deterrent component to punishment, insofar as accountability for the crimes of the past may deter the commission of crimes in the future. In principle, fear of punishment mitigates recidivism. Such deterrence may be specific to individual abusers and may also be general. Societies laced with accountability may move towards democratization, peace, and stability. These outcomes are key structural factors that encourage what Mark Osiel would call the "thinking citizen" to flourish. [FN52] Osiel *362 posits that the "thinking citizen" represents the best guard against future atrocity. [FN53] In addition, the process of justice may prompt cathartic vindication for survivors of human rights abuses, some sense of solace for the loved ones of those murdered, rehabilitation of certain offenders, and the possibility of individual forgiveness. In this sense, accountability can serve reconstructive goals. [FN54] Moreover, law sends a message, and expressive theories of law tell us that this signaling function is critical to the development of social norms. Expressive theories of law "look not so much at whether a law deters or whether a law punishes, but at the message we get from a law." [FN55] This expressive function also can help to develop an authenticated historical record of the violence.
Each of these goals is important to Afghanistan. Afghanistan's history of localized tribal and religious justice, its lack of centralized institutions, [FN56] and its understandable hostility to outsiders problematize the imposition of any state-imposed or internationally-driven judicial remedies. There is skepticism among many Afghans toward international organizations, foreign actors, [FN57] and national state institutions. In terms of national institutions, there is near complete distrust: "The Afghan state court system has never been seen as fair and impartial, but rather subject to concerns about the social status of the people involved, willing to take bribes, or simply ignoring the questions of legal process entirely." [FN58] Yet, paradoxically, attaining the conceptual goals connected to prosecuting and punishing offenders is pressing since Afghanistan's progress toward a post-conflict society is at best halting and may in fact be stagnant. Afghanistan is increasingly splintered into fiefdoms run by local strongmen. [FN59] " [I] nternal security has collapsed to the point where humanitarian aid no longer reaches many regions." [FN60] *363 Although, on the one hand, it may be too early for transitional justice efforts in Afghanistan insofar as the transition from war to peace has not yet occurred, on the other hand, justice initiatives might facilitate the politics of transition and unification. Moreover, at some point, saying it is too early for justice simply becomes an excuse for inertia. Initiating such efforts is also important to ensure that the focus of reconstruction efforts does not shift entirely to Iraq.
However, there is a need for modesty in assessing the transformative potential of law. Depending on the circumstances, law can only achieve fully some of these goals, only part of them, or none of them. Much depends on the legitimacy [FN61] with which rule of law intercessions are perceived by local populations. In many ways, legitimacy is locally assessed. Rama Mani puts it well: "If ideas and institutions about as fundamental and personal a value as justice are imposed from the outside without an internal resonance, they may flounder, notwithstanding their assertions of universality." [FN62] Accordingly, sensitivity to the local contours the effectiveness of international justice initiatives. Attentiveness to local context can encourage deontological denunciation to be meaningful. This attentiveness also can facilitate deterrence, insofar as deterrence is maximized when undertaken in a manner that resonates in local cultures--the environments in which law matters most and in which the actual abuses take place. Furthermore, Diane Amann clearly explains the contingency of the expressive value with her observation that "[t]he message understood, rather than the message intended, is critical." [FN63] In this sense, I argue that taking local community standards into account pertains to each of the retributive, deterrent, expressive, and reconstructive goals of punishment. When law is supported by community consensus, it will serve as a more effective conduit for the condemnation of that community as well as the expressiveness of the legal function. [FN64] As suggested by Dan Kahan, criminal law may play some role in the development of social norms. [FN65] But, in order to do so even modestly, it must be *364 communicated in language that resonates among local populations and in a manner that is familiar. Otherwise, its expressive meaning will be highly externalized.
This leads to a broader concern regarding international criminal law, which runs the risk of offering a deterritorialized one-size-fits-all approach to the judicialization of mass atrocity. Instead, consideration ought to be given to contextual, humanistic, and individuated responses. This means that international legal standards, which often are perceived as derivative of Western rights-discourse, must be translated trans-culturally. This argument does not call for the nihilistic absence of cross-cultural notions of good and evil or right and wrong. Rather, it draws considerable inspiration from the work of Radhika Coomaraswamy, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, who concludes:
[P]eople should recognize that internationally accepted standards and norms do exist, in defiance of post-modernist tendencies. Being sensitive to cultural relativism cannot imply putting hard-won battles on human rights up for grabs. . . . What must be seen as negotiable are the strategies of enforcement and implementation . . . . [FN66] This contextual approach is often a challenge for international lawyers, who may have a tendency to romanticize the process of law as detached from culture and society, and Western human rights activists, some of whom may view their work as akin to messianic salvation. Moreover, a critical perspective on criminal trials in the wake of mass violence recognizes that the individualization of guilt central to the criminal process may obfuscate the role of collective responsibility, complicity of foreign states, power politics, artful manipulation of religion, and patriarchy in the propagation of violence.
To be sure, defining the content of the local is by no means self-evident. In Afghanistan, the content of the local is determined and controlled by violence, force, and war. In order for invocations of the local to carry greater normative legitimacy, the process by which the local is defined needs to be opened up and internally pluralized. Victims of exclusionary practices within culture may prefer reforming culture rather than abandoning it. As a result, *365 transitional justice cannot be pursued in the absence of democratization as the two are mutually reinforcing. The point is not to wait until democracy arrives and then seek justice, but rather to pursue justice in order to induce democratic change and individual access to group cultural definitions. The Chair of the newly created Judicial Commission of Afghanistan, Bahauddin Baha, has affirmed that Afghanistan's legal system will be based on traditional Islamic law (shari'a). [FN71] Baha *366 states that Afghanistan is "an Islamic country" that should "implement Islamic law." [FN72] There is reason to believe that the conception of shari'a envisioned by Baha and the Commission bears some parallels, at least in the area of the treatment of gender, with the version of shari'a in force under the Taliban. To be sure, Baha calls the Taliban's harsh interpretation of shari'a something "they made up themselves," [FN73] but it is unclear whether the Commission's understanding of Islamic law differs from that of the Taliban as a matter of degree or as a matter of kind. [FN74] The reality is that the Afghan justice system "is dominated by religious conservatives who have more in common with the Taliban than with Karzai." [FN75] The Commission is overwhelmingly composed of Islamic clerics educated solely in religious schools (madrassas). [FN76] Furthermore, among those members of the Afghanistan Supreme Court whose educational qualifications are publicly known there is not a single individual with a secular law degree. [FN77] Assuredly, the Taliban is largely a product of a culture of war and a legacy of violence and, as a result, its edicts emerged more proximately from this culture of war than the Islamic religion in which they were cloaked. "Taliban rule, in one sense, was the forced application of conservative Pashtun village life in Afghanistan's cities." [FN78] Islamic law in post-Taliban Afghanistan may continue to be applied on the ground through these norms of village life, whether Pashtun or other, and, given the ongoing fighting prevalent *367 throughout Afghanistan, through this prism of war. Many of these local norms are deeply misogynistic. In fact, the new Chief Justice of Afghanistan, Fazel Hadi Shinwari, has issued a number of rulings based upon a merger of shari'a with local and tribal law that are deeply troubling from a human rights perspective. [FN79] Shari'a laws are set forth in and formulaically originate from a number of important sources. These include primary sources such as the Qur'an (the divine revelation) and the hadith, also called the sunna, which consists of the utterances and actions of the Prophet Muhammed. [FN80] The main secondary sources of Islamic law are Ijma' (consensus) and Qiyas (analogy), both of which derive from the ijtihad, a contested process of deductive reasoning by which Qur'an or sunna are applied to new concerns, and Istishab (legal presumption). [FN81] The substantive differences between the content and provenance of Islamic law and international human rights law are complex. Any limited discussion does a disservice to these complexities and runs the risk of essentialism which, as wisely pointed out by Professor El Fadl, opens the door to "deprecating [the] subject into a caricature." [FN82] However, even cursory discussion can be of some guidance, although it is clear that this discussion constitutes the equivalent of painting with a broad brush and focuses on what religious leaders say, as opposed to how adherents to religion aspire to live their lives in faith. It is also important not to overstate the differences, but to rejoice in the fact that many tenets of international human rights and humanitarian law are central to Islamic law. [FN83] As such, although there are important differences between the two, international human rights law and Islam are not incommensurable. Moreover, democracy, human rights, and Islam are not mutually exclusive. [FN84] El Fadl observes that Islam is compatible with *368 democracy, stating that many Muslims aspire for democracy and would do so much more affirmatively if they did not live under threat of persecution, imprisonment, and torture. [FN85] However, there are important differences pertaining to the treatment of gender. The difficult question is whether adhering to particular Islamic conceptions of the good can lead to prosecution and punishment through international criminal process for certain infringements of international human rights law. Although violence such as rape and sexual terror practiced by the Taliban fall outside the sphere of legitimization through Islamic law, certain aspects of the gender apartheid prevalent in Afghanistan necessitate more careful attention. Moreover, as shall be discussed in Part V, local practices of offering women into marriage and sexual slavery in order to repay blood debts and atone for human rights abuses could, based on the jurisprudence of international tribunals, be found to infringe international criminal law and hence trigger punishment. "In the West, natural law doctrine eventually gave way to positivism, where law properly speaking is . . . determined by the legislature." [FN86] On the other hand, Oba observes that within the Islamic tradition, "law, religious ethics, and morality form an integral part of the same normative process." [FN87] Unsurprisingly, then, Islamic figures "have pointed out that the Western separation of church and state, of secular and religious authority, is alien to the jurisprudence and political thought of the Islamic tradition." [FN88] This Islamic tradition has not been operationalized. For example, non-religious law dominates the regulatory framework of Muslim countries, in particular in contracts and commercial affairs. However, religious law has considerable and growing influence in the areas of family law, inheritance, criminal law, and individual rights. [FN89] According to one observer, "Islam does not have a tradition of *369 complex theorizing about the international system," [FN90] largely because the international system formally consists of the umma (community of Islamic believers) and others. [FN91] This is a somewhat essentialized view, insofar as certain traditional Islamic norms do in fact govern intercommunal relations. These norms stem from a conceptual world divided in two halves: dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam) and dar al-harb (the non-Islamic world, an abode of war). Rules and practices emerged to mediate the relationships between the dar al-Islam and coexisting civilizations in the dar al-harb. [FN92] These rules, norms, and practices are called the siyar. In fact, " [s] iyar is the branch of the Shari'a . . . which best represents the international law of Islam." [FN93] As the "international law of Islam merely anticipated the creation of a universal state bound by the Shari'a and governed by a single ruler," [FN94] the siyar theoretically was designed to be a temporary, transitional institution. The siyar is fairly limited in scope and its main focus is the regulation of the use of force.
The enforcement and authority of the siyar derive from its divine origins. This is unlike public international law, whose enforcement and authority largely derive from the consent of states. The siyar accords little importance to individual rights. In fact, it "generated a scheme in which the value of human life was always subordinate to the common good of Muslim society." [FN95] Whereas public international law is built around institutions--most notably the state and intergovernmental entities--Islamic international law focuses on the umma. [FN96] To this end, public international law's focus on state sovereignty as a lynch-pin of international legal legitimacy stands outside the traditional conception of Islamic law. [FN97] To be sure, "[m]odern Muslim states have rarely pushed Islamic theory in the international system." [FN98] Muslim nation-states insist on their sovereignty. For example, Pakistan treated fellow *370 Muslims fleeing famine, war, and repression in neighboring Afghanistan as foreign aliens, with limited legal rights, and capable of being expelled on the basis of the territorial integrity of Pakistan notwithstanding the conceptual absence of such territorial integrity within the umma. [FN99] Other Muslim states have welcomed public international law concepts of territorial boundaries and the resolution of related disputes through international legal institutions applying public international law. [FN100] Notwithstanding the acceptance of public international law among Muslim state elites, Sohail Hashemi observes that "the ideal of a united Muslim world remains--however inchoate--a central aspect of the normative framework of Islamic activism." [FN101] These activists point out that many of the Muslim nation-states that exist today were initially created by European colonial powers or were once the "fiefdoms of local elites anxious to use the modern state for their own benefit." [FN102] Although these states eventually achieved some legitimacy, this legitimacy is not unchallenged. In fact, it is under siege, not in the least by influential religious and fundamentalist movements that refuse to accept formal divisions within the umma. [FN103] The sanctity of state sovereignty also has been subject to parallel challenges by human rights activists. These challenges prompt the "relative normativity" of international norms, in which the value of national sovereignty--although still central to international order [FN104] --erodes once that sovereignty conflicts with protecting persons from massive human rights abuses. [FN105] However, according primacy to the rights of individuals is by no means a value-neutral exercise. It is in fact quite judgmental. This was one of Prosper Weil's initial fears--namely that a privileged group would create a hierarchy, throwing out the purported equality of states and *371 undermining "the inherent pluralism of international society." [FN106] While universal human rights carry with them the appearance of neutrality and aculturality, such a characterization may be misleading. Some scholars perceive a Eurocentric bias in international law and human rights enforcement. Shelley Wright, for example, comments that "[a] major gap in many analyses of human rights is the lack of any deep or complex awareness of 42 the historical context in which they developed." [FN107] This context is one of Eurocentrism, whose dominance is taken as axiomatic and neutral. [FN108] The universality of international law is closely connected to the colonial experience. This is what Wright labels "diffusionism," namely "the process by which Europeans claim for themselves the capacity to spread civilisation and the benefits of European rationalism and enlightenment to the non-European world sharply separated from Europe and defined as non-rational, unenlightened, uncivilised, and backwards." [FN109] Another critique posits that international human rights are not a cultural phenomenon narrowly tied to the West, but rather a derivative culture linked to a deterritorialized group of elites from both the developed and developing world that operate in United Nations fora, diplomatic meetings, and the NGO community. According to this critique, posited by Sally Merry, this deterritorialized epistemic community has developed its own cultural norms, its own modalities for rule-making, and its own sense of moral certainty. [FN110] Regardless of their source, human rights are often presented through meta-narratives of universality. Wright perceptively observes that presumptions form part of the problem. She notes that many Euro-American commentators tend to dismiss "cultural relativism" or "difference" as annoyances and examine how they may be "contained or dealt with." [FN116] This tendency ensconces universal human rights as the rule and culture as derogating therefrom, instead of seeing rights themselves as the product of culture. "For human rights as they are currently defined in universalist terms cultural or other differences must always be a problem and will always result in discomfort and denial." [FN117] Differences that arise are perceived as infringements from the *373 universal. What then becomes impossible is "alterity," namely a relationship of equality and mutual respect between different "others." [FN118] In order for the international legal order to be perceived with legitimacy or credibility, some efforts toward alterity must be made. After all, "cultural diversity is not a problem but rather a necessary prerequisite for the survival of human beings as human." [FN119] One of the reasons such a diverse integration has been lacking is that, according to Rama Mani, there "is a troubling imbalance or 'injustice' in the study of justice" that derives from "the predominance of Western-generated theories and the absence of non-Western philosophical discourse." [FN120] Hilary Charlesworth suggests an explanation for this absence of dissident discourse, stating that "[a]nalyses of the foundations and scope of international human rights law frequently lapse into heroic or mystical language: it is almost as if this branch of international law were both too valuable and too fragile to sustain critique." [FN121] In the end, though, immunizing this branch of law from critique may lead to a reification feared even by supporters of universalism. Karima Bennoune, for example, suggests that universalist approaches are "not inherently dogmatic, though they can be if . . . insensitive, un-self-conscious or triumphalist, and this is a distinction we must not lose sight of." [FN122] Although it is impossible to generalize unassailably about what the Muslim world thinks about international human rights norms and the criminal punishment of those who defy those norms, it is possible to conclude that important and in many cases growing constituencies within the Muslim world do experience some dissonance between their lives and these norms. This dissonance emerges in part from tangible conceptual differences between Islamic and international legal norms, which, as discussed previously, can represent different ontologies for living, functioning, and conceptualizing the world. [FN124] and the ideational software of globalization. They also may be concerned with the immediacy with which these rights are to be implemented and the uniformity of the implementation process. [FN125] Regardless of the precise etymology of that which presently constitutes international human rights law, the corpus of this law is perceived by many in the Muslim world as decidedly Western in flavor, yet brazenly imposed on all. Furthermore, even among Muslims observers who do not challenge the concept of the nation-state itself, dissonance is prompted by geopolitical tensions. In the past, Muslim states have criticized the "West for the way it used its universal human rights to judge and condemn others." [FN126] The imposition of universal and purportedly neutral human rights standards may be perceived as the political manifestation of Western hegemony. This imposition is layered upon the fact that Muslim nations historically have been excluded and currently are marginalized from the formulation of international law and institutions, although they remain the objects of this law and these institutions. This sense of exclusion is particularly poignant given that there are over one billion Muslims worldwide and that Muslims constitute a majority in over forty states. [FN127] Murden notes that, by the middle of the twenty-first century, Muslims will likely constitute over one-third of the world's population. [FN128] The end result is civilizational exclusion from the collective of humanity. In turn, this civilizational exclusion constitutes a human rights issue: Within the established array of human rights, is there not a right to participate meaningfully in the structures that create world order? [FN129] In the end, the use of what might be perceived as "outsider" rights to vindicate oppression may not be the most effective manner to build social norms within afflicted states. This is so for four principal reasons, each related to the tension between outsider rights and insider lives. First, as pointed out by numerous scholars, *375 including Richard Falk, [FN130] Leti Volpp, [FN131] Upendra Baxi, [FN132] and others, [FN133] the "outsider" has committed abuses in the name of promoting rights. Second, the "outsider" may exhort rights for others, but not always for itself. [FN134] A third concern is that the "outsider" *376 generally favors civil and political rights over economic rights. [FN135] Although more recent international human rights treaties aim at integrating civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, international crimes do not include serious breaches of economic and social rights. [FN136] Western concern with the oppressiveness of the burqa illustrates the gap between Western "rights-speak" and the realities of life in many developing nations. "The West has almost obsessively focused on the veil as a symbol of the Taliban's discriminatory treatment of women. To 'Westerners' the burqa is a 'kind of body bag for the living."' [FN137] On the other hand, for most *377 Afghan women, "what they wear is the least of their worries." [FN138] Instead, they are primarily concerned with earning a living; access to food, housing, employment and education; the removal of landmines; the availability of health care; and surviving child-birth. [FN139] Yet, how many of these worries are conceived of affirmatively by the West in general--and the United States in particular--as rights? Constructive change for women in Afghanistan "requires the reduction of poverty, increased opportunities for education and work, and, above all, recognition of the value of the work that these women already do." [FN140] Moreover, Western understandings of the content of civil rights may not translate effectively elsewhere. Again, the burqa provides an insightful example. Immediately following the abdication of the Taliban, some of the warlords who took control of Afghanistan passed edicts that made the wearing of the burqa optional. But women certainly have not thrown it off en masse. [FN141] This suggests that what "to the outside world . . . was the most obvious and chilling symbol of the Taliban rule" has, within Afghanistan, a "meaning" that "is more complicated." [FN142] More disquieting is the fact that one major reason why women still wear the burqa is because it is simply too dangerous to go out in public without it. [FN143] Large groups of men, often with the support of local officials, roam the streets to terrorize and attack women not clad in the burqa. To a large extent, this climate of fear derives from the lack of public security which, in turn, can be traced to inadequate peace-keeping on the part of the United *378 States and NATO and their official support of abusive warlords. [FN146] Indeed, there was considerable support, but at that time most of Africa and much of Asia and the Pacific were under colonial rule. [FN147] There are other contrarian and nuanced responses to the empirical reality that many developing nations have signed onto human rights treaties. One response is that many states sign onto international human rights treaties because this is a good way for illegitimate governments to appear legitimate or ensure the continued receipt of foreign aid. After all, there is a tangible difference between treaty ratification and treaty compliance. [FN148] Scholars voice broader and less cynical responses as well. In this vein, Falk argues that these treaties "evolved out of Western initiatives and priorities, with only nominal non-Western participation." [FN149] Bahar comments that "while stripped of a voice in the making of allegedly universal international law, Asian states unwillingly remained its objects." [FN150] Simon Murden points out that the response of Muslim states was one of "limited accommodation" to the Universal Declaration, which "was accepted only in part by many Muslim states." [FN151] "Muslim states had trouble signing up [to] these liberal rights because Islamic rights were not based on the natural rights of the individual, but on those outlined in Islamic law and the *379 sharia." [FN152] In the end, Muslims who write on international law do so with an awareness that public international law, a product of Western culture, is universally entrenched as the normative standard and will be used to judge Islamic legal doctrines, which will be deemed defective if they violate the international norms. . . . [I]nternational law is perceived as something outside (traditional) Islam, which Islam needs to account for, respond to, explain, or make useless. For the Islamic scholar, public international law is foreign. As a consequence, the authority of public international law over Muslims, its legal quality, is inherently problematic. [FN153] On the other hand, there is nothing to gain from entirely dismissing the normative force of international human rights law and the institutions that implement that law. Such a rejection may undermine the rule of law and may also lead to impunity for aggressors, frustration for victims, and dissolve accountability for unspeakably egregious crimes against humanity. Entirely dismissing this apparatus assumes that oppression is part of the cultural software of those communities where oppression occurs. Stuart Hampshire sagely advises that " [t] here is nothing . . . culture-bound in the great evils of human experience." [FN154] Although there may be plural conceptions of the good, there is a much more singular or monist conception of these great evils. "These great evils, universally recognized, form the basis of moral argument in every culture and every epoch, regardless of how much the culture's positive ideal and conceptions of the good vary." [FN155] To this David Luban pointedly adds: "There is no society . . . in which gratuitous infliction of the great evils is tolerable." [FN156] Entirely dismissing the normative force of international human rights law also assumes there can be no room for overlap between the international and the local, between the secular and the religious, and between the West and the rest. It is doubtful *380 that there is no overlap, nor opportunity for transcultural consensus. Perry [FN157] and Drinan [FN158] offer the example of the 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights, adopted by consensus of 172 states, to repudiate the argument that it is a lost cause to endeavor to bridge gaps between international human rights, local lives, and religious pluralism. To be sure, this does not deny that there may be particularized disagreement whether a particular practice violates a human right and, if so, how accountability for that is to be determined, whether such accountability should take the form of criminalization, and what form of punishment or restitution is proper.
In this vein, it is important to contemplate a communitarian vision of justice, in which the societal and cultural characteristics of a locality inform and articulate the implementation of justice. This approach entails uncovering a basis for commonality by understanding local difference. Moreover, as Wright points out, this process "may also mean applying standards for human behavior that actively work against European dominance, something which will make many proponents of 'universal' human rights very uncomfortable." [FN159] Although difficult, this may well be a necessary task, given Wright "[w]e do not abandon human rights by embedding them in culture. We in fact increase accountability and responsibility for human rights abuses and the genuinely revolutionary potential that they promise." [FN160] The integration of international criminal law with the local is particularly important in the Afghan context. This is so for a number of reasons, including the understandable skepticism with which international interventions are perceived and, collaterally, the reality that Islamic modalities for justice provided important sources for continuity and predictability among Afghans successively subjected to the failed nature of the Afghan state. There is space within Islam for such a sedimentary process of integration, particularly regarding the censure of what Hampshire and Luban would call "great evils." However, locating this space within local customary law--through which much of Islamic law is filtered in daily life--is, as discussed below, considerably more complex.
*381 V. Customary Laws in Afghanistan
Local customs that do not contravene a clear Islamic precept become part of Islamic law. [FN161] This contributes to the deeply heterogenous nature of the Muslim world. [FN162] As Professor El Fadl observes, Islamic law is far more flexible and malleable than is commonly assumed . . . [it] is similar in some important respects to the common law system. . . . Far from being a rigid and nonresponsive system, [Islamic law] engages the cultural paradigms of its adherents in an active and dynamic fashion. [FN163] Identity in Afghanistan is multi-faceted. Afghans share strong attachments both to Islam and ethnicity. For the majority Pashtuns, ethnicity brings with it detailed customary laws, the Pashtunwali, that inform much of daily life and filter many Islamic norms, particularly in rural areas. Other ethnic groups in Afghanistan also have local customs that animate local law-in-practice.
The International Legal Foundation ("ILF"), a nongovernmental organization, has undertaken a compilation of the Pashtunwali, specifically as currently applied in southern and eastern Afghanistan. [FN164] The Pashtunwali, which has been called a "form of common law," [FN165] "de facto . . . govern[s] the lives of a majority of the population." [FN166] The Pashtunwali, along with other customary legal systems in other regions of Afghanistan, continued to function "reasonably well" even during the "past quarter century of war." [FN167] This may not be surprising given that the Pashtunwali emerges from a culture of war. Since war officially is waged only among men, the Pashtunwali reflects a patriarchal world view. Moreover, Roy Gutman observes that the Pashtunwali, as a system of common law, *382 changed over the 1990's in response to ongoing warfare and the migration to Afghanistan of Osama bin Laden and Arab fighters. [FN168] Gutman observes that some practices of this group, including those that involve the status of women, became integrated into the Pashtunwali by virtue of fatwa (religious edict), governmental directive, or other public pronouncements related to dispute resolution. [FN169] The contingency of these practices is evident in Shaheed's observation that it is easy to promote radical, and purportedly "Islamic," reform when the costs of reform are visited upon disempowered groups such as women. [FN170] In principle, the Pashtunwali provides that the right to seek justice lies with the victim or the family of the victim. Justice for a wrong can be pursued through a blood feud, which can be averted by payment of blood money, more formally presented in Western legal systems as restitution or reparation. "If you killed my relatives, you owe me a blood debt. And this is not a blood debt that can be paid at The Hague." [FN171] The matter is to be settled by Afghans, not by foreigners for Afghans, and "the mere fact that the state throws somebody in jail is not necessarily considered justice." [FN172] The Pashtunwali is ordinary law that can apply to human rights abusers and perpetrators of gender crimes. The number of marakchi presiding over any given dispute is not pre-determined. Ordinarily, half of the marakchi will be drawn from the village or tribe of each disputant. The Pashtunwali, however, explicitly states that marakchi are expected to be impartial. As the ILF reports, "if a party suspects undue favoritism by a member, he may object. If these suspicions prove to be well-founded, the offending member may be replaced." [FN178] The length of the jirga proceeding also is indeterminate, ranging from days to weeks.
[FN179] This depends on the nature and importance of the disputed issues.
At the beginning of the session, cash or property is collected as a surety or guarantee and given to a third-party for safe keeping. This practice is known as machilgha or baramta.
[FN180] Disputants can plead their own cases or avail themselves of a representative. Jirga decisions are rendered orally. They may set forth general rules and have precedential value (tselay).
[FN181] Marakchi rely on prior decisions and tselay to resolve the conflicts before them.
[FN182] There also is an appellate structure. A disputant dissatisfied with the decision of a jirga may request that another jirgareview the case. If the disputant remains dissatisfied, he may ask a member of that second jirga to request a third review (takhm).
[FN183] All disputants must accept the final decision of the takhm. Punishments for failing to abide by the outcome of the takhm range from cash fines to the burning of the house of the guilty or unsuccessful disputant. [FN184] Those responsible for the enforcement and implementation of *384 jirga decisions are known as arbakai. [FN185] In ancient Aryan tribes, the Arbakai led groups of warriors in wartime and maintained law and order in peacetime. Today, they . . . are given considerable immunity in their communities and cannot be harmed or disobeyed. Those who do so are subject to the punishments set by the Arbakai organization. [FN186] 
B. Substantive Law and Remedies
The Pashtunwali covers a broad swath of issues, including inheritance, transactions, obligations, and property ownership. For the purpose of this analysis, only those portions of the Pashtunwali related to justice for criminal harms to the person, specifically harms to women, shall be considered.
With the exception of certain sex crimes, the Pashtunwali is based upon what Westerners might call restorative justice. The point is not to exact retribution by punishing the offender or the offender's family, but rather to make the victim, victim's family, or clan whole in light of the injustice suffered. Therefore, rather than being incarcerated to repent for a wrong committed, the offender or his family is asked to pay poar (blood money).
[FN187] The amount of poar is determined by the jirga in accordance with the nerkhs, namely recognized amounts of damages for different wrongs.
[FN188] These damages are somewhat standardized among the Pashtun tribes and include cash, services, animals, and also the transfer of women. For example, the poar for intentional murder without abuse or torture in the largest Pashtun tribe (the Ahmed Zai tribe) "requires the perpetrator's family to give two fair and virgin girls or pighlas (also known as speen paitsa, got laka, and ronee) to be wedded to a member of the victim's family following special ceremonies. [FN190] The nerkhs of the Wazir tribe specify that a murder be punished by death, giving blood money to the victim's family, or *385 giving a girl to the victim's family. [FN191] However, "generally, girls are preferred to money, because when the girls are wedded to the victim's family, kinship and blood sharing will transform the severe enmity into friendship." [FN192] In fact, every Pashtun tribe permits restitution to be effected through the offering of girls or young women. Although it is unclear whether providing a girl from one family to the other as a means of settling a blood debt accords with Islamic law in theory, this manifestation of poar is accepted among local disputants as legitimate in terms of Islamic law in practice.
Furthermore, the offender or his family is required to perform nanawati--essentially, asking for forgiveness.
[FN193] The purpose of nanawati is to eliminate enmity through apology. Nanawati can take different forms. It can involve carrying the victim's body to the gravesite. [FN194] It can involve transferring goods or services. In these forms, nanawati can overlap with the poar. Just as with the poar, the nanawati depends on the offense. The ILF reports that the nanawati for the murder and abduction of a married woman requires the giving of four copies of the Holy Koran, four women, and a fat sheep.
[FN195]
Poars for assault are determined mathematically, with the poar for murder set as a baseline. These poars depend on the nature of the injury and the weapon used. The nerkhs provide poar for the following injuries: an eye for half a murder; two eyes for one murder; one ear for half a murder; two ears for one murder; the tongue for one murder; two legs for one murder; two lips for one murder; a front tooth for one murder; other teeth for 1/12th or 1/13th of a murder; cutting genitals for two murders.
[FN196] The poars may increase if the wounds are caused by a gun, knife, or sword. [FN197] Crimes against women and sexual offenses are treated separately. These crimes are accounted for by poars and, in certain exceptional cases, by more severe retributive punishment. The kidnapping of a married woman entails a poar equivalent to seven murders.
[FN198] If a woman enters a stranger's house seeking asylum and *386 the owner of the house gives her shelter, he is considered a kidnapper and punished accordingly.
[FN199] Adultery leads to the execution of both the woman and man--no poar is required.
[FN200] If a man kidnaps a woman and takes her to his house by force, he will be required to pay poar for one murder to save his own life and an additional half a murder to the relatives of the girl. [FN201] With regard to sexual assault, if the victim "does not struggle against, or otherwise resist" the perpetrator, she is deemed to be a willing participant and both she and the perpetrator will be killed.
[FN202] If the victim "screams and struggles," the nerkhs require that the aggressor's ear be cut off, that he pay a large poar, or that he be "sexually insulted;" a person who kills the aggressor is only required to pay a poar equivalent to half a murder.
[FN203] The ILF reported a jirga decision in which the rape of a married woman entitled the woman's family "to receive two women . . . from the members of the [offending] man's household.
[His] uncle had two wives and was forced to give up one of his wives to the family of the aggrieved woman . . . as fair compensation for the crime." [FN204] Other crimes also are accounted for by poars. In terms of domestic violence, a husband who beats his wife and thereby "breaks a bone, injures a body part or kills her," creates an entitlement for the wife's father to claim poar. [FN205] Property crimes usually involve a poar amounting to cash payments, including restitution in cases of stolen goods. [FN206] In conclusion, the Pashtunwali's provisions regarding accountability for criminal acts and human rights abuses embed the subjugation of women. This gives rise to an impasse. At present, the incorporation of the local in the adjudication of mass violence in Afghanistan is itself a form of mass violence. Some Afghan leaders endeavor to immunize the Pashtunwali from international scrutiny based on the importance of local autonomy and so-called cultural difference. [FN207] Unfortunately, this rationale obscures the reality that only certain elements of the local, i.e., empowered males, ever were *387 involved in the imposition of the Pashtunwali as local law. As such, until the local truly is derived from an inclusive process in which cultural dissent is accepted, if not welcomed, these sorts of arguments should be viewed with caution.
VI. Conclusion
The judicialization of systemic human rights abuses in Afghanistan, in particular gender crimes, involves much more than a straightforward legal or administrative exercise. The effectiveness of judicialization is not preordained. Instead, effectiveness is precariously contingent on achieving a consensual balance between international human rights norms, criminal punishment, religious conviction, and the pluralism of lives lived locally. It is not axiomatic that just because an intervention is international in provenance that it is necessarily better than something local. Nor is the obverse self-evident: A local intervention is not guaranteed to be more effective just because of its locality. To be sure, both local and international interventions may form part of the bureaucracy of punishment, a phenomenon of institutionalization suggested by Michel Foucault. [FN208] That said, although the power to punish may augment the authoritativeness of an intervening institution, it is not clear that a bureaucratized and authoritative punishment necessarily leads to legitimacy in victim or aggressor communities.
Afghanistan starkly presents the dilemmas created from involving the local in the adjudication of international crimes against women. Although the local may have more meaning among certain constituencies (in the case of Afghanistan, patriarchal local constituencies), it may further disempower and victimize other generally marginalized constituencies. For these marginalized constituencies, the local may simply serve as a conduit for further violence. In the case of these constituencies, the international might be a more meaningful mechanism for justice, notwithstanding or perhaps because of its distance from lives lived locally.
In any event, punishing those who abuse human rights will not create new social norms when local populations are coerced into adjudicating through either international or local proceedings. For the women of Afghanistan, such coercion "entails either leaving one's community . . . or else praying that one's culture becomes *388 'extinct."' [FN209] From the perspective of the international lawyer, while it is important to demonstrate sensitivity to local context, it also is important to recognize that local values in certain spaces may only reflect the values of empowered segments of society. This is the case in Afghanistan. Religion and culture in Afghanistan are neither static nor immutable. They are politically contingent and, as such, influenced by power structures.
Accountability for serious human rights abusers should be pursued jointly with the right for all members of a local community to define the laws, practices, and values of their community. [FN210] This approach gives voice to members of religious and cultural communities, not just to the leaders of those communities. Failing to do so means that reformers can make rights arguments only in distant secular terms, thereby "completely relinquishing the terms of cultural and religious identity to patriarchs." [FN211] For Afghanistan, an immediate need is to investigate and document crimes against women and preserve any evidence that is uncovered. The more difficult issue whose contours this Article has sought to demarcate involves what to do with the information that investigations discover. Questions would arise whether indictments should be issued and, if so, as to which individuals should be indicted. This, in turn, prompts an additional series of inquiries. Careful consideration ought to be given to the law that applies and the forum best suited to enforce the law deemed to be applicable. In this latter regard, a number of choices arise. Accountability can be pursued through extraordinary proceedings entirely at the international level (ad hoc tribunals [FN212] or the ICC). approaches that combine some or all of these three options also are possible. These might involve hybrid courts in Afghanistan, [FN214] internationally assisted jirgas, or special chambers of national courts. Moreover, broader approaches such as truth commissions might complement whatever judicial remedies are adopted. [FN215] There is no one-size-fits-all approach. In the case of Afghanistan, both ends of the spectrum--exclusively international approaches involving international criminal law or exclusively local approaches involving Islamic and, especially, customary law--suffer from serious shortcomings. Exclusively international approaches are plagued by the externalization of justice from certain constituencies, particularly aggressor constituencies, while local approaches are hampered by the internalization of harm by other constituencies, particularly victim constituencies.
International donors and advisors would like the new Afghanistan to embody international standards of human rights, including the rights of women. Many of those who are in positions of authority on the ground in Afghanistan incline toward shari'a as applied through local custom. It is unclear whether any generalization can be made as to what is preferred by those currently disempowered--i.e., the group of persons victimized by the conduct that this Article suggests ought to be subject to some sort of legal process. In the end, neither the global nor the local offers magical solutions. Consequently, Afghanistan may be a fertile ground for serious consideration of hybrid mechanisms [FN216] that borrow from the *390 international and invoke the local while pluralizing the types of groups that contribute to the content of the local.
Constructing hybrid approaches could open an important discursive space for extralegal conversations. There is a role for the rule of law in political transition. Legal process creates a constructive forum in which clashes between various social groups, along with many individual grievances, can be aired and mediated. This can facilitate discourse among Afghan religious conservatives and secular modernists [FN217] and, simultaneously, among members of cultural groups and the elites of those same groups. This process also recognizes the embrace by women of a complex identity that demands security, emphasizes rights, and welcomes religion and culture. . Foreign national tribunals may most externalize justice, followed by international tribunals. Distanced trials in international institutions may favor ethnic neutrality over local engagement of judges, impose one-size-fits-all international norms over local traditions and sentiments, and bypass the need to reconstruct local judicial systems through locally-engaged trials. That said, although judgments issued by local tribunals may be the least susceptible to externalization, in many cases local tribunals may be destroyed in the aftermath of conflict, there may be little domestic capacity or infrastructure, and local officials may lack legitimacy. However, international lawyers should recognize that just because something is international in provenance does not necessarily mean that it is more legitimate than something local in provenance.
[FN6]. The focus of this Article is on the Pashtunwali. An analysis of other customary legal systems particular to other regions of Afghanistan lies outside the scope of this Article. That said, these other local legal systems do not diverge much from the Pashtunwali in their treatment of gender or in their approaches to restoration. See Part V infra.
[FN7]. Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 Yale L.J. 1399, 1456, 1467 (2003) (positing that a woman should have a right to exit a normative community and choose another one if she wants to, but should also have a right to stay within her community and reform it through the articulation of dissenting interpretations of the norms of that community). 
